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Review Article 
T H E  F A M I L Y  AND C H A N G E  
A discussion of Eli Zaretsky, Capitalism, the Family and Personal Life (New 
York: Harper & Row, 1976)and Edward Shorter, The Making of the Modern 
Family (New York: Basic Books, 1975). 
LOUISE A. TILLY 
With the work of Philippe Ari~s, Philip Slater, Eli Zaretsky, Edward Shorter 
and Richard Sennett, the privatization and individuation of personal life have 
become grand themes of historical speculation. 1 All of these scholars, and 
others, agree that a historical trend towards privatization has in fact occurred. 
Not all of them, however, agree on the desirability of such a trend. Of tile 
authors whose books are reviewed here, Eli Zaretsky weighs the positive and 
negative aspects of privatization, while Edward Shorter is among those who 
clearly approve and welcome the trend. 
Zaretsky's slim volume is tile reissue of a two part article, originally published 
in Socialist Revohttion in 1973. It is an uneasy mixture of explication of 
contemporary feminist analysis, socialist revision of this analysis, and a 
modified functionalist historical sketch of the family under capitalism. 
Zaretsky sees the contemporary family as an institution in which personal life 
can develop: "The rise of capitalism isolated the family from socialized 
production as it created a historically new sphere of personal life among the 
masses of the people. The family now became the major space in society in 
which an individual self could be valued 'for itself' " (p. 31). Zaretsky is 
critical of some feminist thought for seeing the family too simply as an 
oppressive institution. He also notes the shortcoming of much socialist 
thought which uncritically accepts capitalist devaluation of housework and 
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the private arena because of  their absence from systems of  exchange. His 
desire to understand the family as an "integral part of society that changes 
continuously as a whole" (p. 32) is indeed well-taken and important. 
Zaretsky's essay has quite legitimately been influential because it restores 
family and the private arena as important categories to be examined for an 
understanding of  the process of  large-scale structural change in the past. The 
radical and revolutionary ideologies of  the twentieth century, as Zaretsky 
interprets them, are expressions of  a hope that "humanity can pass beyond a 
life dominated by the relations of  production" (p. 77). This study is his 
contribution to that hope. 
Zaretsky's study was not intended to be an historical study, despite the 
misleading blurb on the back cover attributed to Christopher Lasch: "One of 
the clearest discussions of  the history of the family." Capitalism, the Family 
and Personal Life is primarily a study of  ideology; what history it contains is 
derivative and sketchy. Although Zaretsky has done no historical research and 
does not claim to have done so, he is dealing with the past, and as he does, he 
does not make very effective use of  available published work. More impor- 
tantly, his use of evidence from literate sources and his concentration on 
ideology turns the reader from the concrete question of  what happened to 
the working class family with the development of industrial capitalism, to the 
abstract question of, why? The lack of  evidence means that Zaretsky's 
historical argument must be judged unproved: 
For those reduced to proletarian status from the petty bourgeoisie, one's 
individual identity could no longer be realized through work or through 
the ownerstfip of  property - individuals now began to develop the need to 
be valued for themselves . . . .  The family became the major sphere of 
society in which the individual could be foremost - it was the only space 
the proletarians 'owned'.  Within it, a new sphere of  social activity began to 
take shape - personal life (p. 61). 
Zaretsky sees the emergence of  personal life as a twentieth century phenome- 
non, rooted in the early stages of industrial capitalism. 
Here Zaretsky fails to explain the meaning of  a "sphere" of  social activity. He 
appears to be speaking of  the possibility of  individual autonomy. Thus he 
follows the spread of an ideology of  personal freedom and identity from the 
middle class to the working class with the transformation of  the mode of 
production. What he needs to prove his argument is evidence that work, 
before capitalism, produced a sense of  individuality, and that the family, for 
proletarians, was the source of  such a sense after industrialization. I do not 
believe he can find such evidence. 
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Was a sense of individual identity a product of the work of the petty 
bourgeoisie of the eighteenth century? Was "individual identity" a relevant 
category for shopkeepers, artisans, and land-owning peasants before in- 
dustrialization? Their primary work identification was with the household 
and family in which they lived and worked, with the family which owned the 
property or shop. The community and the artisan corporation were also 
countervailing loyalties which diminished any sense of individualism. It is 
present-minded and anachronistic to seek individualism in such an economic 
and value system. Zaretsky's misreading of the attitudes of these groups 
comes from the fact that he does not examine the material life, the organiza- 
tion of work and the statements of these social groups themselves. The 
resistance of peasants and workers to capitalism lay not in a desire to preserve 
individualism but in the need to protect their control over their work, the 
organizational and political bases in comnmnity, craft, and family. I question 
whether earlier workers ever had that sense of individualism which Zaretsky 
attributes to them. 
On the other hand, did the family become increasingly valued as a source of 
individual identity among proletarianized workers? Zaretsky accepts the 
notion of nineteenth-century socialists and middle class reformers that the 
family was greatly modified by industrialization and lost most of its 
economic meaning. The family did, of course, lose its productive function. 
The costs of industrial growth were indeed heaw, and they were borne in a 
very unequal way by tile families of the popular classes. These families had to 
migrate to find work. They had to submit several family members to crushing 
work schedules and miserable wages in order to make ends meet. In the 
process, the family acted not as a comfort, but as a resource, and that is why, 
it seems to me, the working class family, though changed in the process, 
emerged strong and viable in the twentieth century. Tile family survived, and 
thrived, because it adapted and offered a way to cope with industrial change. 
It was the main institution which served the popular classes as a buffer to the 
large-scale processes of structural change such as industrialization and ur- 
banization. The family was frequently the only resource of the proletarian. 
Family and kin sponsored migration, found jobs, provided housing and 
services for workers. Ctfildren contributed to their parents as they grew up 
and went to work. Wives worked when their wages were needed; they bore 
children, the future hope of family prosperity; they managed consumption 
for family members who were in the labor force. It was not because it was the 
sphere of a private life separate from work that the proletarian family 
survived, but because it continued to provide many basic needs for its 
members. Zaretsky's belief that the working class joined the middle class 
search for personal autonomy as a consequence of a kind of ideological 
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embourgeoisement is not supported by the evidence. His choice of evidence 
from ideology but not from material life, makes the working class family 
seem a passive institution, acted upon from above in the process of economic 
change. I would argue that the family was an active force in moderating the 
effects of such change, and in the process influenced tt~e outcome in a reaI 
way. An important missing piece of evidence is the link between personal life 
choices and increased productivity, increased per capita wealth and declining 
infant and child mortality. 
Zaretsky's problem is that in weaving together structure, behavior, and 
ideology, he doesn't keep his strands straight. The result is a rather lumpy 
piece of work. On such a simple matter as time and place, he is often unclear, 
There are few dates as guidelines, few geographic limitations; there is no sense 
of unevenness of change over time and space. Most important, there is no 
separate examination of changes in family by class. 
Zaretsky's interpretation of the family stresses its social meaning. He sees the 
commodity productive function of the family economy replaced by its role 
of reproducing the labor force (p. 33). Yet can we understand the economy 
and social reality of the family only from the view of society at large or 
through the ideology of the middle class? Seen from the perspective of the 
family, not from the perspective of society, reproduction looks different. 
Children could be wage earners; later they could support their parents in old 
age. With the development of education, an institution promoted in the 
self-interest of the ruling class, children could be the route to improved status 
and well-being for the working class as well as for the middle class family. 
Much of what Zaretsky sees as the emergence of personal life is the growing 
orientation of families toward children as a kind of property, as infant and 
child mortality declined in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and 
as better wages and higher productivity reduced the need for child labor, 
Thus Zaretsky's problem with evidence is aggravated by the fact that 
although he is writing about the family, he analyzes economic activity and 
reproduction only at the level of society. He has no handle on the inter- 
connections between economy and family in the areas of production, repro- 
duction, and consumption. When he examines economy and reproduction, he 
works on the societal level; only when he studies personal life does he go to 
the family as tile unit of analysis. The lack of comparability in the analysis 
stems from this methodological inconsistency. Although he would like to be 
dialectical, he is stuck with a one-way developmental scheme, based on 
abstract evidence and reducing the institution of the family to a passive 
object which reacts to powerful economic forces and is shaped by vaguely 
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functional ideologies. Zaretsky's book is provocative and useful; what is 
needed now is the examination of  historical evidence to test his theory. I 
suspect that the ideological explanation of  changing family life will be much 
less attractive once it is tested against adequate historical evidence. 
Shorter's The Making of the Modern Family is long on evidence. He provides 
us with a wealth of  historical evidence and overwhelms us with claims that 
this evidence proves his argument. I find Shorter's study a culture-bound, 
elitist interpretation of  change in family life. It shows contempt for ordinary 
people of  the past and for their culture. It embodies an ahistorical refusal to 
understand such people on their own terms. The "traditional" world he 
describes is a world full of  emotionless humanoids addicted to irrational and 
damaging custom. Shorter feels no need to analyze or understand this world. 
He sees no value in it; it has no interest except as a voyeuristic foil to his 
exaltation of  present-day opportunities for self-expression and hedonism. 
Shorter claims to have written a history of  feeling, of  how a "surge of  
sentiment" beginning in tile eighteenth century has transformed life in 
Western Europe and the United States. He examines this transformation in 
three areas: 1) the relationship between men and women in courtship and 
sexuality; 2) mother-infant relationships; 3) the boundary between family 
and community. The plan of the book is simple and clear. Two chapters 
review household and community, men and women, in "traditional" society. 
(He defines the "traditional" period as that time between the Reformation 
and the middle of the eighteenth century.) Four chapters examine change in 
tile three areas described above. (There are separate chapters for sexual 
revolution and romance.) One chapter gives us an explanation for the 
changes, and a concluding chapter suggests the direction for continuing 
change. 
The "reason why" the sweeping revolution in sentiment has occurred, Shorter 
tells us, is market capitalism. "At the same time that mentalities were 
undergoing the historic shift toward individualism and affection, tile 
economic substructure of  the world in which village people lived was in 
upheaval as well" (pp. 255-256). Capitalism entailed the growth of markets 
and geographic mobility for persons; it meant an improved material standard 
of living; it meant tile growth of  an industrial proletariat. From the temporal 
coincidence of  these economic and social changes and the growth of  senti- 
ment, Shorter concludes that they must be connected: 
Is there a direct causal relationship between the two? May we argue that 
the illegitimacy explosion or the surge of  sentiment in courting was 
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propelled upward by these economic changes? Although any satisfactory 
explanation must alternately be complex and incorporate many different 
kinds of variables, I believe that laissez-faire marketplace organization, 
capitalist production, and the beginnings of proletarianization among the 
work force were more important than any other factors in the spread of 
sentiment. . .  The logic of the marketplace positively demands indi- 
vidualism (pp. 258-259). 
Shorter elaborates this argument further in his concluding discussion. The 
explanation is plausible; it is catchy and simple. Does he prove it? The links 
between the economic changes and changes in feeling are not adequately 
identified or described. The crude comparisons of the two-stage model - 
before and after - are oversimplified. Temporal correlations are likely to be 
weakened by numerous other variables. The remainder of this review 
examines three aspects of Shorter's work: his sources, method, and explana- 
tion. 
Shorter makes a point of telling us that he does not use literary sources, 
which he believes (quite rightly) to be biased in favor of middle class 
experience and attitudes. Instead, he uses quantitative sources, complemented 
by observations by literate middle class persons who were "close to the 
people but not of thena." He rejects primary reliance on quantitative social 
and economic indicators because "such investigations make deadly reading, 
[and] they still leave open to inference what these men and women felt 
about each other as they were generating all those children - and what they 
felt about the children" (pp. 10-11). In order to trace feeling, the task he has 
chosen for himself, Shorter must rely on middle class observers. 
He substitutes doctors and lower-level bureaucrats for the novelists Ire 
mistrusts. Yet these groups shared contempt for the peasant and urban 
working class life they were describing. He also relies on antiquarians and 
folklorists who compulsively collected the customs of a disappearing world 
that they much admired. Shorter provides a stunning compendium of con- 
temporary observation, particularly of the French peasantry. Somehow, 
however, he accepts only the attitude of those who wrote of it with scorn. 
Tile result is a melding of favorable and unfavorable reports into an un- 
systematic description of the "traditional" past, laced with amused or 
horrified contempt and misunderstanding. 
In the end, these observers and Shorter come up with a description of 
behavior which is little different from that of the novelists whose work he 
eschews. The only difference is that the novels are labelled fiction. The 
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arranged marriage, the wedding feast and the county fair in Madame Bovary, 
the selfish peasants of  La Terre, tile socially awkward and drunken Parisian 
workers of L'Assommoir, the sensuous miners of Germinal would be quite at 
home in The Making of the Modern Family. 
Shorter's middle class observers were biased, just as the novelists were, and 
for the same reasons. He acknowledges as much: "We have to struggle 
desperately to untangle the doctors' enlightened, urbane, rationalistic 
prejudices from the reality . . . "  (p. 11). These observers were the agents of  
change; they were the carriers of ideas about proper behavior which they 
were seeking to inrpose on the peasants and workers whose unenlightened, 
cloddish behavior they were reporting. Shorter claims that tie disentangles 
their prejudice from his facts, but the results simply don' t  show. 
The second chief source for Shorter's data are statistical records. Shorter has 
done a mammoth job of  assembling scattered series and producing new series. 
The appendices contain comparative data on the fertility of  landed and 
landless labor, age differences between spouses, temporal patterns of  concep- 
tion, and infant mortality. These should be useful to other scholars, as will be 
the exhaustive notes to these tables. The problem is that the data and 
Shorter's questions pass like ships in the night, both bulking large, but never 
touching. Shorter claims, "the core of  the history of  the family is precisely 
this chronicle of  sentiments. The structures that encase a family's life are, 
after all, fairly visible" (p. 9). But are they? We need to know the structural 
framework of  the past : how the material base shaped and constrained family 
life. Shorter systematically excludes this from his text. Statistics tell us about 
behavior; Shorter is asking how people think and feel. To answer his 
questions he needs to resort to biased sources, the middle class observers, who 
were always ready to say how people felt. The question then is, does he do 
this critically? 
Here we turn to Shorter's method. Shorter is scrupulous in criticizing his 
sources. For example, on the question of male supremacy and lovelessness in 
the French peasantry, he cites several early ethnographic accounts. He then 
notes, "This sort of ethnology soon reaches its limits. We have no way of 
knowing whether these peasant couples held hands before the evening fire, 
carressed each other tenderly . . . "  This time, his sources give him no clue. 
That does not prevent Shorter from concluding: "But it seems unlikely. The 
emotional distance separating the couple appears unbridgeable . . . "  (p. 60). 
Sometimes he provides a contrary case or two, such as the "one Lyon 
husband who willed all his goods to 'my dearest wife, the object of  my most 
tender affection and to whom I owe my life's happiness.' " He concludes 
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nevertheless that "relations between men and women in the household seem 
to have been affectionless everywhere in France" (p. 61). Although he has 
endeavored to find middle class observers who are likely to be close to the 
people, he has not limited his conclusions to what his sources can tell him. 
How can such sources be used critically? Shorter's main criterion for 
accepting an interpretation as correct is the frequency a given kind of  
observation appears among his sources. This criterion is no improvement over 
the frequency with which nineteenth-century French novelists reported the 
selfishness, social bumbling and coldness of  the peasantry. 2 Shorter could 
have made his compilation of  observations more systematic by internal 
comparison by geographic region, class, productive system, and so on. Symp- 
tomatic of  the lack of this comparison is the fact that there is no map of  
France in the book. Such a map could help the reader locate the villages and 
regions Shorter is talking about. These place names give a false concreteness 
to the book. In two pages (59-60) ,  we read testimony about wife-husband 
relations in Deux Sevres, the Ain, the Jura, and the Rhone. 3 Yet we have no 
clue about how to interpret this testimony. Shorter's explanation is an insult 
to his readers' intelligence. It is a deduction based not on the facts culled 
from random reports, but on the alleged fit of  these facts with his argument. 
For specific examples of  this method of  presentation, let us look more closely 
at two sections of  the book: that on the "First Sexual Revolution" and that 
on "Mothers and Infant," both of  which call on substantial statistical data for 
proof. 
Shorter builds his case for tile sexual revolution of  the mid- to late-eighteenth 
century on the increased rate of  illegitimacy which occurred in many parts of  
Europe at about that time. He has gathered (and published in several articles, 
so these data are not included in this book) temporal series of illegitimacy 
ratios and the incidence of  prebridal pregnancy in many areas. In his book, he 
enlivens the account of what he claims to be a vast increase in the rate of  
intercourse (and the pleasure people get from it) with the comments of  
alarmed contemporary moral critics. It is true that the people he quotes were 
not "thin-lipped pastors, aching for fire and brimstone to fall upon Sodom 
and Gomorrah; these were not crackbrained moralizers in the fastness of  
some provincial nest" (p. 97). Shorter is disingenuous in suggesting, however, 
that these observers were disinterested or unbiased. They too feared certain 
alleged consequences of  the "collapse of morality": increased potential for 
disorder among the popular classes and decline of their productive capacity. 
They were biased because of  their fears; their description of  the pathology of 
working class illegitimacy must be examined with suspicion and systemati- 
cally compared with other evidence. 
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There are three kinds of  evidence for the premarital sexual revolution on 
which Shorter builds his case. He tells us quite frankly that "each [is] rather 
spindly in itself, but together sufficient to main the case." These are 1) "the 
illegitimacy ratio alone, which is a rather ambiguous demographic indicator; 
2) ... premarital pregnancy, ... which in itself is an indicator of  little else than 
sexual behavior within courtship; 3) ... middle class observers ... whose 
testimony, alone, might reflect little more than the libidinal preoccupations 
of  the observers themselves." Shorter then insists, "Taken together, these 
three indicators point to a massive change in premarital sexual morality in the 
years 1750-1850"  (pp. 97-98) .  Again Shorter has described evidence of  a 
behavior change - the likelihood that marriage would take place after a 
couple had intercourse and before the birth o f  a child - and deduced a 
change in feeling. He also insists that we accept three flawed types of  
evidence as a substitute for one good piece of  evidence. Three times zero is 
still zero; his argument is not a substitute for an effective proof. The only 
directly relevant evidence is not the quantitative data but the biased middle 
class description. 
The examination of  relationships between mothers and infants is similarly 
handled. Shorter tells us, "Mothers in villages and small towns across the 
continent from Cornwall to Lettland seldom departed from the traditional - 
often hideously hurtful - infant hygiene and childrearing practices, and this 
is what lacking 'spontaneity'  is all about. Nor did these mothers often (some 
say 'never') see their infants as human beings with the same capacities for joy 
and pain as they themselves" (p. 169). The statistical evidence: the high rate 
of  infant mortality and the widespread recourse to wet nursing (in France) 
until the end of  the nineteenth century. (Tile decline of  both these indicators 
is late for Shorter's case, but here he does make internal comparisons to 
strengthen Iris position. Thus the middle class use of  wet nurses declined 
earlier, he claims, and so did infant mortality in that class.) He notes that 
poverty and the need for a mother's productive work were involved, but he 
makes little effort to understand circumstances. Not a hint that the lack of  
changes of  clothing for infants, as for adults, was due to poverty. No clue that 
swaddling was a way to keep babies warm and safe in interiors inefficiently 
heated by fire. Not much suggestion that there was no safe alternative to 
human milk for infant feeding until the end of  the nineteenth century. If  a 
mother could not nurse, a wet nurse was a safer alternative than artificial 
feeding. In 1857, one British observer of  French foundling hospitals' use of  
wet nurses for infants saw it as much superior to the English custom of giving 
infants artificial feeding. 4 Mortality rates were generally lower with wet 
nurses titan with artificial feeding. This is not to suggest that the mortality o f  
infants sent to wet nurses was not shockingly high, nor that there were not 
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many abuses in the system. It is that Shorter's insistence that wet nursing was 
symptomatic  of  lack of  concern for infants is simply wrong. 
His interpretat ion of  the fact that wet nursing was relatively seldom used by 
French and English factory workers is simply ludicrous: 
It is significant that the one group that never either boarded out its own 
infants on a large scale or took in nurslings from outside was the factory 
workers, the spearhead of modernization. Although women in industrial 
plants often used day nurses, or hand fed their infants, they did not send 
them from home for long periods .... If despite the direst poverty and 
sorest temptat ions to fail the 'sacrifice test, '  proletarian women kept their 
infants at home, it must have been because their att i tudes were already 
modern (p. 177). 
He cites three examples in support of  this assertion that factory workers were 
modern because they seldom used wet nurses. The behavioral description is 
correct, for both France and England. But was the cause a modern atti tude of 
love and concern for infants? The textile cities of  Lancashire and of  France's 
industrial Nord had enormously high infant mortal i ty,  a fact which was 
directly tied to the lack of  breast feeding. The distribution of  wet-nursing in 
France primarily in artisanal and commercial cities suggests that we nmst look 
elsewhere for an explanation of why industrial workers did not use wet 
nurses, s The internal comparison of  circumstances in industrial and artisanal 
cities and between England and France suggests to me that the long- 
continued use of  wet-nursing was not  a consequence of  old-fashioned 
att i tudes and heedlessness for children, but of  small scale, household produc- 
tion units, in France as compared to England, and within France artisanal 
cities as compared to industrial. In such households, wives were likely to 
work, but it was hard for them to nurse their own children. There was a 
rough correlation between scale of industry and wet-nursing. In France, there 
was continuation of  artisanal production well into the twentieth century. So 
the wet-nursing was tied to French "backwardness," not of  att i tude, but of  
industrial structure. These artisanal, commercial cities had a long-established 
symbiotic relationslfip with nearby country areas where poor peasant women, 
their former industrial by-employment destroyed by industrialization, were 
willing to nurse urban infants. In textile cities, demand for female workers 
was so strong, that young women from the countryside came in to work in 
the mills. There were relatively few rural women seeking income through 
nursing. The network of  connections between urban workers and nearby 
peasant women willing to take in nurslings was not there. In the textile city, 
furthermore, there were few job opportunit ies for older married women who 
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were no longer able to work in the mills. (Mill work was not only sex-specific, 
it was also age-specific, employing mostly young persons.) These older 
women were available as baby tenders in the industrial cities. 
The child care techniques which Shorter sees as so thoughtlessly destructive 
probably never disappeared in France and elsewhere in Europe. My mother, 
born in 1905 in an artisanal family in Piedmont, Italy, was swaddled in a 
narrow winding cloth and sent out to a wet nurse. The cloth is a jacquard 
weave cotton with a flowered white on white design, neatly embroidered 
(with her initials) by her mother. My first child, born in a provincial city in 
France in 1955, was swaddled (with his arms flee) in the "maillot ffanqais," a 
wrapped set of diapers and blankets, immobilizing him from his armpits 
down. It was the very "maillot" that the doctors Shorter quotes so despised. 
These babies were not abused; they were being treated in accordance with 
custom but it was custom infused with solicitude. Ironically, the practice in 
most American hospital nurseries has returned to the concept of  swaddling. 
Babies are again tightly wrapped in receiving blankets, for the nursery 
attendants insist this is comforting to the babies, and reduces crying. Cradles 
and rocking have also come back into common practice. Shorter credulously 
accepts and offers us this observer's report: "most pernicious is the rural 
practice of  forcing children to go to sleep through immoderate rocking, 
through swinging and shaking, through lugging up and down and loud singing, 
methods which are sooner appropriate to effect ... stupidity and idiocy" (p. 
170). Rocking, singing, swinging are today accepted and prescribed infant 
care. 
Shorter acknowledges tile shortcomings of  his infant mortality statistics, 
which illuminate us not at all on the causes of  infant death. (Most infants 
died of  gastrointestinal disease or upper respiratory infection. The former 
was as likely to be due to artificial food as to wet nurses, and the latter to 
infectious process not susceptible to the medical technology of the time.) 
"None of  these statistics offer a "definitive" proof of  the crystallization of  
maternal affection . . . .  Yet the way these mothers acted was clearly changing" 
(p. 195). Although his statistics prove little, he insists on his interpretation: 
"the point is that these [traditional] mothers did not care, and that is why 
their children vanished in the ghastly slaughter of  the innocents that was 
traditional child rearing. Custom and tradition and the frozen emotionality of  
ancien-r~gime life gripped with deadly force. When the surge of sentiment 
shattered this grip, infant morality plunged, and maternal tenderness became 
part of  the world we know so well" (p. 204). As a historian, I leave 
contemporary social scientists the task of  criticizing Shorter's understanding 
of  the love-lighted present. 
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Shorter's use of comparative method, called on when convenient, omitted 
when not, is suspect also in an even more crucial way. Again, we find him 
conscientiously explaining what he's up to: "Unfortunately, the solid, 
primary evidence I have to present concerns mainly France, with parts of 
Germany and Scandinavia thrown in from time to time. And not even all of 
France or all of Bavaria ... but only peasant and propertied France towards 
the end of the eighteenth century, and Bavaria ... towards the middle of the 
nineteenth" (p. 14). Candor aside, he makes his claim: "When the quantita- 
tive data for these [other] numerous countries come out as the qualitative, 
descriptive material for France and Germany suggest they should, the scholar 
can take heart that many patches are like his own. It is precipitous, of course, 
on my part, to suggest that all of them are, but I think I 'm right" (p. 15). 
Despite his breezy candor, however, Shorter ignores the chief danger in the 
form of aggregate comparison he uses: that of compositional effects. He is 
comparing life in rural, peasant France, using it as a proxy for traditional 
Europe, to twentieth-century urban life, in France and the United States, a 
proxy for modern society. Industrialization and urbanization have seen 
enormous transfers of population to urban settings and wage earning work. 
There have been numberless changes in the material aspects of life, in levels of 
mortality and fertility, and in the attitudes of populations faced with new 
sets of constraints and opportunities rising out of the economic system they 
find themselves in. Is Shorter's story the story of attitude change or the 
history of the growth of urban, industrial populations? The only way to 
know is to compare seventeenth-century peasants and twentieth-century 
peasants, seventeenth-century urban bourgeois and twentieth-century ones, 
eighteenth-century wage earning workers and twentieth-century ones. The 
differences among the groups strongly resemble the chronological develop- 
ment Shorter claims happened. If we wish to find sentiment and love in a 
couple in traditional Europe, do we have to look beyond "Romeo and 
Juliet"? There was affection and caring in the upper classes of traditional 
Europe. Likewise, the personal lives of the twentieth-century Basque peasants 
studied by Pierre Bourdieu were constrained by family property interest just 
as were the eighteenth-century peasants Shorter tells us about. The twentieth- 
century working class couples studied by Elizabeth Bott enjoy their socia- 
bility with sex segregated peers and family members. The working class 
couples of Paris interviewedin the 1950s by Chombart de Lauwe and those 
of the Bay Area of the 1970s surveyed by Lillian Rubin are as frozen in 
their inability to communicate feeling to each other as are Shorter's tra- 
ditional people. 6 His notion that workers, as the victims of industrialization, 
were also victors in terms of personal freedom and self-expression through 
sexuality, is untenable. Shorter's unsystematic and sloppy comparisons make 
it impossible to sort out compositional and developmental changes. 
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What of his conclusions?I have no quarrel with his list of the "reasons why." 
There is no doubt that markets have enlarged, that standards of living have 
increased, that there has been a great increase in the proportionate impor- 
tance of proletarian wage earners in the population, a decrease of small 
property owners and small scale household productive units. These are the 
relevant processes. Why doesn't Shorter discuss them more fully, and explain 
the links between them and changes in mentalities as he goes along? Why 
doesn't he tell us the effect of these processes on work, on standard of living, 
on place of residence, on property holding, on fertility, on the size and 
composition of cla.;ses? Why instead are we barraged with modernization, 
"the dissolution of this structured, changeless, compact, traditional order" 
(p. 21), surges of sentiment, birth of feeling, sexual expression, and the like? 
Shorter's aggregate comparisons, his slick ex post explanations give no picture 
of the unevenness and cost of the processes he so smoothly pulls out of his 
hat in chapter seven. Finally, although much of his statistical data are 
demographic in nature, Shorter omits any description of overall demographic 
change, either on the aggregate or on the household level. 
The Making o f  the Modern Family provides us with useful quantitative data, 
many fascinating impressionistic reports. Digging out this material was a real 
tour de force. Shorter introduces the notion of social history methods - 
theory testing, study of the past away from politics at the center, com- 
parison, collective biography. But in the end, we are left with a biased, 
incomplete and optimistic account of how social change has transformed 
people's lives. This account leaves out the internal complexity of the process, 
forgets the costs, and glorifies the present. No one advocates a return to the 
grim reality of pre-industrial Europe, with its high mortality, low economic 
productivity, discomforts, threat of starvation. The historical problem of 
change in the family is still waiting to be solved. 
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